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ENVIRONMENTAL LAw-THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN IMPACT STATE-
MENT: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS-Loveless v. Yantis,
82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Eastlake Community Council
v. Roanoke Associates, Inc., 82-Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973);
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508
P.2d 166 (1973); Juanita Bay Valley Community Association v. City
of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).
The State of Washington has attempted to protect its environment
by enactment of a statute closely patterned after the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1 The State Environmental
Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA),2 together with similar statutes in many
other states, 3 requires governmental agencies to prepare a statement
1. 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970) (hereinafter citations will
be only to U.S.C.).
2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21 C (Supp. 1973). Of the 14 environmental acts passed
in Washington in 1970-71 (see Roe & Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of
1971 and its"1973"Amendments, 49 WASH. L. REV. 509 n.2 (1974)), ofily SEPA and
the Shoreline Management Act (SMA), WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (Supp. 1973),
have received judicial attention. The SMA, of course, is limited in scope to shorelines
and adjacent areas.
3. Like Washington, maiy other states have followed NEPA's lead by enacting
"little NEPAs" of their own. See Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy
Acts, 3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 50,090 (1973), for the best general discussion of the provi-
sions of state environmental policy acts. See also Summary and Comments, 3 ENVIRON.
L. REP. 10,126 (1973), listing environmental policy legislation enacted in the various
states.
State legislation paralleling NEPA and SEPA has been passed in California, Con-
necticut, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Virginia, Wis-
consin and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See California Environmental Quality
Act of 1970 (CEQA), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973); Con-
necticut Environmental Policy Act, Pub. Act No. 73-562 (1973) (effective February 1,
1975); Indiana Environmental Policy Act, IND. CODE §§ 13-1-10-1 et seq. (1973), IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 35-5301 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Maryland Environmental Policy Act of
1973, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 §§ 447 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN.
LAWS c.30, §§ 61 et seq. (1973); Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, ch. 412,
[ 1973] Minn. Laws, Ist Reg. Sess. 687; Montana Environmental Policy Act of 1971,
MON. REV. CODE §§ 69-6501 et seq. (Supp. 1973); New Mexico Environmental Quality
Act of 1971, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-20-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973); North Carolina Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Vir-
ginia Environmental Quality Act of 1972, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-177 et seq. (Interim
Supp. 1972), and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.107-.112 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11(Supp. 1973); Puerto Rico Public Policy Environmental Act of 1970, P.R. LAws ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 1121 etseq.(Supp. 1973).
"Little NEPAs" of more limited scope include: Delaware Coastal Zone Act of 1971,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. F, §§ 7001 et seq. (Non-cum. Supp. 1972); Nevada Public Utili-
ties Environmental Act, NEV. STAT. §§ 704.820 et seq. (1971).
Other states including Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island and Virginia, have passed constitutional amendments containing
language similar to the purpose and policy declarations of NEPA and SEPA. See FLA.
CONST. art. II, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52; N.Y. CONST.
art. XIV, J 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17;" VA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
See generally Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193
(1972).
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discussing in detail the environmental impact of each "major action
significantly affecting the quality of the environment ' 4 in which the
state or one of its subdivisions plays a role. This environmental impact
statement (EIS) requirement plays a most important role in imple-
menting SEPA's environmental mandate.5
The EIS requirement is the most precise of SEPA's procedural
commands. 6 The EIS itself must be a formal, tangible document. Its
contents should reflect intelligent, plenary environmental analysis on
the part of responsible government officials. The EIS serves as both
the showpiece of the developer and as a target for those opposing the
project. It is, in final form, no less than an environmental transcript,
providing a critical portion of the record for administrative decision-
making and judicial review. Hence, because of its visibility and re-
quired specificity, and the importance of its role in decision-making,
the EIS requirement has come to occupy center stage in SEPA's grand
design, and the legal questions surrounding the need for EIS prepara-
tion have captured the attention of all concerned with SEPA.
On four occasions in 1973 Washington appellate courts construing
4. For a discussion of the required contents of an environmental impact statement
under SEPA, see Roe & Lean, supra note 2, at 525-27. Required contents of NEPA
statements are thoroughly discussed in Kross, Preparation of An Environmental Impact
Statement, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 81, 97-131 (1972).
5. The declared policy ofSEPA is:
• * . to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical
assistance, in a manner calculated to: (1) Foster and promote the general welfare:
(2) to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony; and (3) fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Washington citizens.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020 (Supp. 1973). The Act describes procedures by which
this policy may be implemented: agencies must establish new organizational apparatus,
new internal operating policies, guidelines, regulations or procedures (including proce-
dures for determining whether an environmental impact statement is required), and new
consultation processes to include environmental values in decisionmaking. Id. §
43.2 IC.030.
6. The requirement is:
[A] II branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and
public corporations, and counties shall:
* ' . (c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major actions significantly affecting the quality or the environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. § 43.21C.030(3)(c).
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SEPA reversed lower court or agency decisions and remanded for
failure to comply with the Act's EIS requirement. In Stempel v. De--
partment of Water Resources,7 the Washington Supreme Court found
the issuance of a water use permit to a private developer to be a
"major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment,"
and required the Department to act in accordance with the provisions
of SEPA prior to permit issuance.8 In Juanita Bay Valley Community
Association v. City of Kirkland,9 the court of appeals voided the city's
issuance of a grading permit to a private developer because the city
neglected initially to consider environmental factors and determine
whether the grading proposal was a "major action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the environment," requiring the preparation of
an EIS. 10 In Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Associates,
Inc.," the Washington Supreme Court invalidated the City of Seattle's
issuance, without preparing an EIS, of a building permit for.construc-
tion of a five-story condominium apartment building on the shore of
Seattle's Lake Union.' 2 Finally, in Loveless v. Yantis,13 the Wash-
ington court stated in dicta' 4 that SEPA required county commis-
7. 82Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166(1973).
8. Jd.at 119,508P.2dat 172.
9. 9Wn. App. 59,510P.2d 1140(1973).
10. Id. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149. The court stated forcefully that, "the detailed pro-
cedural requirements of SEPA, specifically RCW 43.21C.030, are directly imposed
upon all branches of state government, including municipalities." Id. at 65, 510 P.2d at
1145 (emphasis added).
11. 82 Wn.2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973). The opinion was handed down only one
month after the Juanita Bay decision.
12. 82 Wn.2d at 498, 513 P.2d at 50. The opinion of the court dealing with the
environmental issue may be regarded as either strong dicta or as an alternative holding.
As the court stated at the outset:
We agree with plaintiffs that the building permit was issued in violation of the
Seattle building code, that irregularity was not cured by subsequent compliance
and that, as well, even if the permit issuance Was valid, an environmental impact
statement was required prior to the third renewal of the building permit.
Id. at 478, 513 P.2d at 39 (emphasis added). This statement seems to relegate the
environmental discussion to the status of mere dicta.
However, a number of indications support a contention that the disposition of the
case was at least partially grounded in environmental analysis. The Eastlake dissent
states, for example, that "the majority holds" there has been a violation of the environ-
mental impact statement requirements of SEPA. Id. at 505, 513 P.2d at 54. The dis-
sent's forceful rebuttal of the majority's holding on the narrow procedural ground of
building code violation suggests that the majority had other grounds for decision. Id. at
503-05, 513 P.2d at 53-54. Lastly, SEPA analysis creeps into the majority's ruling on
code violation. For example, the court states, id. at 484-85, 513 P.2d at 43, that, "de-
fendant started the project with full awareness that there were multiple, serious legal
obstacles [to development] ." (Emphasis added.) The "multiple" serious legal obstacles
must refer to either SEPA or SMA issues, in addition to code violation.
13. 82Wn. 2d754,513P. 2d 1023 (1973).
14. The Loveless court upheld the commissioners' decision upon finding that the
submitted plat violated the controlling zoning ordinances. Id. at 762, 513 P.2d at 1028.
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sioners to prepare an EIS before issuing a preliminary approval for a
planned unit development, because approval constituted a "major ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the environment."' 5 The rea-
soning and results of these four Washington decisions emphasize the
need for governmental agencies to analyze carefully SEPA's EIS re-
quirement prior to approval or commencement of a project.
The requirement of EIS preparation has received a comparable
degree of attention in the federal courts. Although some initial at-
tempts were made under NEPA to determine in a one-step analysis
whether an action under review constituted a "major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"'16 re-
quiring the preparation of an EIS, the federal courts have now settled
upon a two-step analysis: 17
(1) Is the proposal a major Federal action? If so,
(2) Will that action significantly affect the quality of the human en-
vironment? If so, an EIS must be prepared.
Washington courts construing SEPA have concurred in this analysis. 18
This note identifies and analyzes those factors, intrinsic to the
above two-step analysis, which properly should be considered by a
court construing, or a rulemaking body implementing, the EIS man-
date of SEPA and other comparable legislation. 19 (The reader may
wish to refer to the Flow Chart, Appendix A, while following the ana-
lytical process suggested in this note.) This note concludes that uni-
form and consistent application of those factors could best be ob-
tained by rulemaking, rather than by ad hoc judicial determination.
15. Id. at 763, 513 P.2d at 1028-29.
16. See, e.g., Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789-90 (D.
Me. 1972).
The Federal Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20.550 et
seq. (1973) (hereinafter CEQ Guidelines), also seem to adopt a one-step analysis by
construing the phrase, "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" as a unity. Id. § 1500.6(a), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20.55 1.
17. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Richardson, - F.2d -, 5 BNA ENVIRON.
REP. 1830 (7th Cir. 1973). where the court found a proposed courthouse annex andjail facility to be a major Federal action, but found that the action would not signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the environment.
18. See Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 489-93, 513 P.2d at 45-47.
19. Constraints of space and time preclude discussion of other important and in-
teresting issues under SEPA, such as: who should prepare the EIS; what information
the EIS should contain; what amount and type of public participation and agency
review is required by the Act?
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I. DEFINING "MAJOR ACTION"
When the language of the Washington court in these SEPA cases is
synthesized with that of other state and federal courts, determination
of whether an "action" is "major" seems to require analysis of the fol-
lowing criteria:20
(1) The nature of the governmental "decision";
(2) the character of the subject "project"; and
(3) the relationship, or "nexus", between the governmental deci-
sion and the subject project.
Each of these three criteria helps define the term "major action," and
thereby describes and delimits the applicable scope of SEPA's EIS
requirement.
A governmental "decision" is the making of an enforceable deter-
mination; in Eastlake, the City of Seattle's grant or denial of a
building permit would constitute such a governmental "decision." The
term "project" means the contemplated endeavor or undertaking it-
self; in Eastlake, for example, the developer's plan for construction of
the condominium was the "project" under consideration. The relation-
ship, or "nexus," between decision and project may best be identified
in terms of the degree of governmental "participation" present in ex-
pediting the project; 21 thus, in Eastlake, the "participation" was sub-
stantial since the governmental decision on the building permit deter-
mined whether the project would be permitted to proceed. 22
These three criteria-"decision," "project" and "nexus"-will now be
examined. Following examination of the nature of these criteria, the
desirability and utility of including each as an essential element of the
"major action" test will be discussed.
A. The Nature of the Governmental "Decision"
Analysis of the nature of the governmental "decision," viewed as
independent. from the character of the subject "project," is an impor-
20. As will be discussed below, a "major action" should be composed of:
(1) a "discretionary, nonduplicative governmental decision;"(2) a "major project;" and
(3) a "minimal link" between decision and project.
21. See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.5(a)(2), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,551.
22. E.g., in Simmans v. Grant, 6 BNA ENvIRON. REP. 1224, 1229 (S.D. Tex.
1973), the court asked whether, "but for" the government action, the project would
have proceeded, with resultant environmental impact.
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tant aspect of SEPA's "major action" test. The "decision" criterion,
however, is more often used in state "little NEPA" analysis than in
NEPA analysis.23 For example, under California's Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA),2 4  the nature of the governmental
decision-which is either "discretionary" or "ministerial" under
CEQA-determines whether that governmental decision
should be examined for its environmental effects; only "discretionary"
decisions require such analysis. 25
Washington courts have engrafted the California approach onto
SEPA, and now consider analysis of the "discretionary" or "ministeri-
al" nature of the governmental decision to be an independent element
of the major action test under SEPA;2 6 thus in Washington, as in Cali-
fornia, a "discretionary" decision is a prerequisite to a major action.
However, this judicial surgery was not accomplished without diffi-
culty. Definitional problems first arose in Juanita Bay, where the court
of appeals held that even though the issuing of a building permit may
have been a ministerial decision prior to SEPA, "SEPA introduces
an element of discretion" into such decisions, making them susceptible
to SEPA's EIS requirement.2 7 Under this analysis, the nature of
the governmental decision before enactment of SEPA is irrelevant be-
23. The federal courts construing NEPA have tended not to focus upon the nature
of the governmental decision as an independent element of the "major action" test. See
note 137 and accompanying text infra.
24. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973).
25. CEQA describes "discretionary" decisions as including, inter alia: "the enact-
ment and amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of zoning variances, the issu-
ance of conditional use permits and the approval of tentative subdivision maps .... "
Id., § 21,080(a). Determination of those decisions which are "ministerial" is left to
California administrative agencies under CEQA. Id., § 21,082. Pursuant to this author-
ity, California's Office of Planning and Research has suggested that "ministerial" deci-
sions include issuance of most building permits and business licenses, and most approv-
als of final subdivision maps and individual utility service connections. OPR Guidelines.
14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15,073 (1973). This scheme was accomplished by amending
the original CEQA. For a discussion of the considerations leading to CEQA's amend-
ments, see Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth--Developers
Chase the Will-O'-The-Wisp, 48 CAL. B.J. 126 (1973).
26. Presumably, if the governmental decision requires judgment or deliberation on
the part of the official or agency, even as to "narrow or limited evaluative points," the
decision should be identified as "discretionary" for the purposes of SEPA. See text ac-
companying note 30 infra. A nondiscretionary decision, on the other hand, would be
ond in which a government official or agency, once certain facts were shown, would be
required by law to act in a prescribed manner, regardless of his/her own opinion or
judgment. Compare 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15,032 (1973).
27. 9 Wn. App. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149. The court held that, "the City failed to
exercise its legislative discretion under SEPA .... " Id.
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cause SEPA's introduction of discretion will make every governmental
decision ipsofacto discretionary.
In Eastlake, "major action" was defined as a "discretionary, nondu-
plicative stage of the building department's approval proceedings rela-
tive to an ongoing major project. '28 The Eastlake court seemed to
depart from the Juanita Bay analysis by indicating that a major action
would result only if the nature of the governmental decision was "dis-
cretionary and nonduplicative" apart from the impact of SEPA. 29
In Loveless, finally, the Washington court appeared to reject the
Juanita Bay analysis, and to modify the Eastlake requirement of "dis-
cretion" by stating that while discretion must inhere in the govern-
mental decision absent SEPA, it need only exist with respect to what
the Loveless court called "narrow or limited evaluative points. '3 0 The
Loveless analysis of the nature of the governmental "decision" thus
occupies somewhat of a middle ground between Juanita Bay and East-
lake.
The question remains whether the governmental "discretion" must
be found to inhere in the decision absent SEPA, as Loveless suggests,
or whether "discretion" is introduced by SEPA itself, as suggested by
Juanita Bay. The proposition is an important one, because of the se-
rious consequences of exclusive adoption of either the Loveless or
Juanita Bay rules. Adoption of the Loveless rule would posit SEPA as
merely important legislation, whose provisions would not per se vitiate
the obligatory commands of other statutes. On the other hand, adop-
tion of the Juanita Bay rule would provide SEPA with a nearly consti-
tutional dimension, since provisions in all other legislation, permissive
or mandatory, would bow to SEPA's provisions in case of conffict.3 1
28. 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46. Where there are several "discretionary"
governmental decisions relating to the same project, environmental analysis must be
conducted for each decision only to the extent that such analysis does not duplicate
analysis already made for other related decisions. Loveless, 82 Wn. 2d at 764-65,
513 P.2d at 1029 (1973).
29. The Eastlake court painstakingly demonstrated that the defendant City of
Seattle had made a discretionary and nonduplicative decision under existing building
code provisions. 82 Wn.2d at 491-92, 513 P.2d at 46-47. In Stempel, the Washington
court implicitly recognized that the Department's decision was discretionary under
existing legislation, since the Department was required to evaluate potential "detriment
to the public welfare" prior to decisionmaking. 82 Wn 2d at 117, 508 P.2d at 171.
30. 82 Wn. 2d at 764, 513 P.2d at 1029. Such "narrow or limited evaluative
points" need not, of course, relate to environmental factors.
31. The difficult question remaining is whether the issuance of, e.g., a building
permit is "ministerial" merely because local legislation deems it so. See generally
A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 55 (3d ed. 1972). In Eastlake,
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Concededly SEPA amends the authorizing legislation of all govern-
ment agencies in Washington by attaching "particular additional du-
ties" (such as the duty of giving "appropriate consideration" to envi-
ronmental values) 32 to existing discretionary decision-making proc-
esses. 33 The Act does not, however, supersede other statutes sub silen-
tio, 34 by unilaterally injecting environmental "discretion" into minis-
terial decisions made pursuant to otherwise obligatory legislation. 35
In short, SEPA affects, but does not create, governmental deci-
sion-making. It is submitted, therefore, that "discretion" should be
for example, the court noted that under the terms of the Seattle Building Code, " 'If
the superintendent of buildings is satisfied' that the application and materials conform
to the law and the building permit fee has been paid 'he shall issue a permit therefor
to the applicant ....... 82 Wn. 2d at 482, 513 P.2d at 41 (emphasis added). Although
this would appear to involve a mere "ministerial" decision, the Eastlake court did not
rule on the matter, since the building permit renewal, under attack, was clearly a
discretionary governmental action under the terms of the Seattle Building Code. It is
of course anomalous to conclude that the initial issuance of a building permit is
exempt from SEPA as a "ministerial" decision, but renewal of the same permit, for the
same project, is "discretionary" and therefore subject to the Act. It is equally anomalous
that a local government should be able to exclude any permit issuance process or other
activity from SEPA's EIS requirement by simply passing legislation which designates
those processes or activities as "ministerial". If this were attempted, the Washington
courts might well employ the Loveless test to find some "narrow or limited evaluative
points," making the decision "discretionary" despite a legislative finding to the contrary.
This could, in time, however, distort an already overworked discretionary-ministerial
dichotomy.
It is notable that the state legislation which grants municipalities the power to
generally regulate building activity clearly designates the municipal function as dis-
cretionary. See WASH. REv. CODE § 35.22.280(25) (1963). Perhaps SEPA's EIS
requirement should be found to apply to all governmental activities which are
"discretionary" under state legislation, regardless of the mandates of local provisions.
The difficulties in resolving these issues in the courts suggest that it is particularly
appropriate for the Legislature to simply designate, or to allow an administrative
agency such as the Department of Ecology to designate, actions which are "discre-
tionary" and therefore subject to SEPA's EIS requirement.
32. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(b).
33. Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 497, 513 P.2d at 50.
34. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In SCRAP, an environmental group sought to
enjoin enforcement of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission allowing
railroads to collect a surcharge on freight rates, by arguing that such enforcement
would violate the provisions of NEPA. The United States Supreme Court held that
alleged noncompliance with NEPA did not give the power to the federal courts to
invade the province of the ICC, as established by the Interstate Commerce Act. The
Court went on to say that "[t] he statutory language in fact indicates that NEPA
was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute." Id. at 694. Since SEPA's
legislative history indicates no legislative intention to depart from the language and
intent of NEPA, but rather indicates an intent to closely parallel the national Act,
see WASH. S. JOUR. 1808-09 (1971), the SCRAP construction of NEPA would seem
applicable to SEPA.
35. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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found to inhere in the governmental decision apart from SEPA, in
accordance with the Loveless rule.
B. Character of the "Project"
Discussion of the nature of the governmental "decision" focused
upon the governmental function itself, regardless of the character of
the subject "project". The analysis here focuses upon the character of
the "project" as an element of major action, ihdependent of the gov-
ernmental function.
The federal courts under NEPA have often used the "character of
the project" criterion to aid in determining whether an action subject
to NEPA was "major". Accordingly, they have considered the phys-
ical magnitude, cost and duration of a project as indicia of its "major-
ness". The results, however, have been conflicting and confusing.
Timber sales transactions of the United States Forest Service, on
seemingly analogous facts, have been deemed both major 36 and not
major.37 Federal-aid construction of a sixteen-story apartment build-
ing was not a major project,38 whereas a sixty-six unit apartment proj-
ect was major.39 While neither a "TOPICS" (street-widening) project40
nor construction of a 4.3 mile Forest Service roadway4 was major, a
state highway bypass project was declared major because of its "inte-
gral connection" with nearby federal-aid highway construction. 42
These examples indicate that, while the federal courts often look to
the "character of the project" to analyze the "major action" require-
ment of NEPA, the results are far from consistent.
In contrast with the federal courts, which often find the "character
of the project" to be a distinct element of "major action," the Cali-
fornia courts or agencies interpreting CEQA do not analyze the char-
acter of the physical undertaking by itself to determine whether its
environmental effects should be studied; instead, they look only to
36. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG) v. Butz, 358 F. Supp.
584 (D. Minn. 1973).
37. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 359 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Wyo.
1973), rev'd, .... F.2c ., 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1844 (10th Cir. 1973).
38. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
39. Echo Park v. Romney, 3 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
40. Julis v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 3 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 20033 (N.D.
Iowa 1972).
41. Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972).
42. Sierra Club v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1804 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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whether the related governmental decision is "discretionary" or "min-
isterial." 43
The Washington Supreme Court, like the federal courts, uses the
"character of the project" criterion as an independent element of the
"major action" test. The Eastlake court distinctly separated the gov-
ernmental "decision" from the related private "project." It then went
on to suggest: "When such separation [between decision and project]
exists ... the character of the project must be considered in determin-
ing whether the government action is to be deemed 'major'. '44 The
Eastlake court found, apparently as a matter of law, that the con-
dominium development under review was a "major project"; however,
the court did not identify those characteristics of the condominium
project which led to this conclusion. 45
It is perhaps difficult, in using the "character of the project" crite-
rion as an independent element of the "major action" test, to distin-
guish the magnitude of the project for purposes of the "major action"
determination in the first step of the analysis, from its environmental
significance for purposes of the "significantly affecting" determination
in the second step.46 Realization that it is not the specific nature of
the project so much as its cost, size and duration which justifies the
label "major project" may alleviate some of the confusion.47 Similarly,
the controversiality, cumulativeness and precedent-setting capability
of a proposal could be determinative factors in appropriate circum-
43. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
44. 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46.
45. Nowhere in the opinion is there mention of a stipulation that either the
"project" or the "action" is major. Neither the City nor the trial court ruled on the
issue. The court apparently interpreted the "clear legislative mandate that SEPA be
given a broad and vigorous construction" as justifying the a priori conclusion that
the Roanoke Reef plan was per se a "major project." Id.
46. See, e.g., Eastlake, id. at 491, 513 P.2d at 46, where the court stated that the
project was "significant in itself." Presumably the court meant "major;" but nonetheless
one wonders if the court's use of the word "significant" might not reflect some
confusion as to the two-step threshold determination.
Also in Eastlake, id. at 491, 513 P.2d at 46, the court spoke of the major "impact"
of government participation in- the project. Since the word "impact" is usually
associated with the "significantly affecting" test, its use by the court in the "major
action" determination is confusing.
The difficulty has also been recognized in the NEPA context. See Simmans v.
Grant, 6 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1224 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
47. See Simmans, 6 BNA ENVIRON. REP. at 1234. See also Lynch, Complying
With NEPA: The Tortuous Path to an Adequate Environmental Impact Statement,
14 ARiZ. L. REV. 717, 726 (1972). Analysis should be made of planning time and
resource and manpower expeditures of both: (1) those implementing the project,
and (2) government approval at all levels.
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stances. 48 A project may be deemed major, then, because of its sheer
magnitude; but that project and the action of which it is a part may
not require an EIS because of insignificant environmental impact.49
C. The "Nexus" Between "Decision" and "Project"
Because NEPA, SEPA and comparable state acts impose their EIS
requirements only upon governmental agencies, there must be a "nex-
us" between the governmental "decision" and the subject "project" to
bring the EIS provisions into play. Where the government is the party
carrying out the project, the connection is direct-the decision is an
integral part of the project50 and the government has a "direct pro-
prietary interest." 51 Where, on the other hand, the government is only
approving or funding an otherwise private activity, serious questions
may arise about whether the requisite "nexus" exists between the gov-
ernmental decision and the private project to render the aggregate ac-
tivity an "action" subject to the EIS requirements of SEPA.
In the federal courts, it appears that even a minimal governmental
involvement with a project will be sufficient to satisfy the "nexus" re-
quirement under SEPA. For example, the court in Davis v. Morton52
found in government approval of the lease of Indian Reservation
lands sufficient connection between decision (approval) and project
48. A project's attendant controversiality indicates its importance, oi "majorness,"
independent of environmental effects, since any project, whether or not related to the
environment, may be subject to protest and disagreement.
Cumulative government approval of building permits for a group of adjacent
single family homes in a forseeably short time period should render the agglomerated
nonmajor projects a "major project." Similarly, where a single building permit
approval sets the stage for many more comparable approvals, a "major project" may
be foreseen. The total project might be developed by numerous parties.
See also Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079,
1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for a discussion of the precedent-setting capability of a
"major Federal action."
49. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Richardson, supra note 17.
50. Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 489, 513 P.2d at 45. The Eastlake court remarked
that this type of action is most common with federal agencies. Id.
51. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247,
263, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059 (1972).
52. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973). In Billings v. Camp, 4 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1744
(D.D.C. 1972), the court required an EIS to be filed prior to a decision by the
Comptroller of the Currency to approve an application to construct a branch banking
facility (even though, presumably, actual construction would be subject to local
zoning and building code regulations).
But see Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (government's action on
request for loan to finance partially construction of a machinery plant was insufficiently
related to demolition of homes, prior to construction, to warrant application of NEPA).
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(negotiation of lease) to make the approval an "action" within the
meaning of NEPA. However, government involvement will not be
found by the federal courts where there is no federal financing, plan-
ning or design involved, and the project is not "under the auspices of a
federal agency."5 3 Federal government involvement must be actual,
not anticipated, and the determination of when that occurs is a factual
one.
5 4
State courts construing little NEPA's have not strayed far from the
federal analysis of decision-project relationships. The California Su-
preme Court in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of
Mono County55 stated unequivocally that CEQA's EIR requirement 56
applied to government approval of private projects so long as the
governmental decision had some "minimal link" with that project
through the funding, permit or regulatory process. 57 Legislation and
court decisions in other states have expressly or impliedly recognized
the applicability of environmental policy mandates to government
approval, permit and licensing processes. 58
53. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 163 (4th Cir. 1973). The multiple decisions
in Ely v. Velde afford an excellent example of the difficulties inherent in making a
decision as to the sufficiency of the connection between "decision" and "project." In
Ely, the State of Virginia applied for federal funding for construction of a prison
reception and medical center. The trial court found, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 1092-93
(E.D. Va. 1971), that NEPA's EIS requirement applied to such a funding scheme.
but that it could not prevail in the face of other, "non-discretionary" federal statutory
commands. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). agreed
that NEPA was applicable, id. at 1137 n.22; moreover, it found that compliance with
the EIS requirement was necessary despite the presence of other seemingly conflicting
and "non-discretionary" legislation. Id. at 1137-38. Virginia then decided to complete
the project without federal funding, thus circumventing the EIS requirement. This
scheme was allowed by the district court, provided that no federal funding, direct or
indirect, was involved. 356 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1973). Throughout this
litigation the character of the project and the nature of the governmental funding
decision remained the same; but the relationship between the governmental
decision and the project, without federal funding, was insufficient to invoke NEPA.
But see Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 197 1).
54. City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 257-59 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049 (1972).
56. The environmental impact report (EIR) requirement is set out in CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21, 100, 21,150 (West. Supp. 1973).
57. 8 Cal. 3d at 263, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771, 502 P.2d at 1059.
58. See Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(8) (Supp. 1973) (requiring the regional planning agency
to report on the "regional impact of the proposed development"); Nevada's Utility
Environmental Protection Act, NEv. REV. STAT. § 704.890 (1971) (requiring Nevada's
Public Service Comm'n to make certain environmental findings prior to granting a
950
Environmental Impact Statements
Although SEPA, like NEPA, does not expressly address itself to
government approval of private projects, Washington courts and liti-
gants alike have accepted that such approvals usually establish the
"minimal link" between decision and project necessary to support a
finding of "major action" within the meaning of SEPA.59 The ease
with which this understanding was reached in Washington may be
explained by the fact that state-and more particularly local-permit
and regulatory decisions often have a much closer "nexus" to the pri-
vate project than do analogous federal decisions.60
The "minimal link" test requires only that the governmental deci-
sion relate to the private project in terms of.61
(1) funding assistance (contract, loan, grant, subsidy and the
like); or
(2) permitting a use (sale or lease of government property, permit
issuance, licensing, entitle rents for use generally); or
(3) regulating a use (pollution control, utilities regulation, etc.).
This test will be readily satisfied by most government funding, permit
and regulatory activities in Washington.
permit for location of utility transmission lines and facilities); North Carolina's
Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-8 (Supp. 1973) (autho-
rizes "all cities, counties, and towns... to require any special purpose unit of govern-
ment and private developer of a major development project to submit detailed envi-
ronmental impact statements. ... ); Vermont's Land Use and Development Act,
as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1973) (establishes de-
tailed conditions and criteria-most notably, conformance with a "capability and de-
velopment plan'-to be considered prior to approval of a private development). Court
decisions include: In Re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973)
(subdivision permit); Hamilton v. Diamond, 70 Misc. 2d 899, 335 N.Y.S.2d 103
(N.Y.App. 1972) (seawall construction permit); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (permit for draining, dredging and filling of wetlands);
Irish v. Green, 4 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1402 (Mich. App. 1972).
59. Stempel, 82 Wn. 2d at 119, 508 P.2d at 172; Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 489, 513
P.2d at 45; Loveless, 82 Wn. 2d at 763, 513 P.2d at 1028-29. Only in Juanita Bay
was there disagreement on this point. The Juanita Bay court relied upon Mammoth
and various federal decisions to apply the "express mandate" of SEPA to the issuance
of a municipal grading permit. 9 Wn. App. at 71-72, 510 P.2d at 1148-49.
See also KING COUNTY CODE § 20.44.040 (3) (1973), which states that "actions"
in-lude granting of permits, franchises, leases and other entitlements for use.
60. E.g., in Juanita Bay, the permit issuing authority (City of Kirkland) examined
detailed ordinance provisions which specified the conditions under which a grading
permit could issue, 9 Wn. App. at 71, 510 P.2d at 1148; whereas in Rucker v. Willis,
484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973), the concern of the federal Corps of Engineers in
approving a pier construction permit was limited to problems of navigability.
61. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,065.
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D. Which Criteria Should be Used in Applying the "Major Action"
Test?
Without question the "discretionary governmental decision" crite-
rion 62 and the "nexus" criterion 63 are both essential components of
the test for "major action." The need for finding a "discretionary"
governmental decision as a criterion of the "major action" test is emi-
nently reasonable, for only if discretion exists to grant or deny the
authorization in question can environmental considerations be acted
upon. The "minimal link" test of the Mammoth court seems an appro-
priate means of insuring that sufficient "nexus" exists between govern-
mental decision and private project to justify imposition of SEPA's
requirements. 64 Since privately initiated projects can be as "major" as
governmentally initiated projects, and certainly are more numerous, it
is proper that they be equally susceptible to SEPA's EIS requirement; 65
the comprehensive environmental planning contemplated by SEPA 66
otherwise would be rendered impossible of attainment.
Although the tests for "discretion" and "nexus" delimit to some ex-
tent the "actions" requiring a "significantly affecting" inquiry under
SEPA, the practical effect of the limitations imposed by these two cri-
teria is negligible. Most important governmental decisions will be
found "discretionary" because of the presence of some "narrow or
limited" issues left to administrative judgment,67 and "nexus" will most
always be satisfied by the "minimal link" test. Thus if only the criteria
of "nexus" and "discretion" comprise the test, "major action" for
practical purposes means "any action." The question remains, then,
whether the "character of the project" 68 should be employed as a third
criterion by which effectively to delimit the group of "major actions"
requiring the "significantly affecting" inquiry.
It is essential to ask whether analysis of the quantitative character
of the subject project 69 as an ingredient of the "major action" test fa-
62. Discussed in Section I-A supra.
63. Discussed in Section I-C supra.
64. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
65. See Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 263-64, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771-72, 502 P.2d at
1059-60.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2).
67. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
68. Discussed in Section I-B supra.
69. Quantitative analysis of environmental impacts must be distinguished from
quantitative analysis of project characteristics themselves. See text following note 110
infra for a discussion of the former.
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cilitates clear thinking, or whether such an approach only introduces
such confusion that the characteristics of the "project" should more
appropriately be considered solely under the "significantly affecting"
test. Should the phrase "major action" define some limited group of
large, important "actions," as an ordinary interpretation of the word
"major" would suggest, or is "major" mere surplusage, bringing vir-
tually all "actions" within SEPA's comprehensive mandate? This ques-
tion is important, because its resolution determines whether Washing-
ton courts and agencies will conduct the "significantly affecting"
inquiry for a limited, or a substantially unlimited, group of govern-
mental "actions."
Where only limited financial resources are available to govern-
mental agencies for implementing SEPA, it appears preferable on bal-
ance to analyze the "character of the project" under the "major ac-
tion" test rather than under the "significantly affecting" test. The
former approach would render only a limited group of governmental
"actions" subject to SEPA's demanding "significantly affecting" test,
permitting concerned governmental agencies to concentrate their ef-
forts only upon major projects which prima facie portend environ-
mental significance. In using the "character of the project" criterion as
an element of the "major action" test, governmental agencies would
initially determine applicability of SEPA's EIS requirement by ana-
lyzing the seriousness or consequence of a project in the abstract
(using measures such as cost, size, duration, controversiality, cumula-
tiveness and precedent- setting capability),0 without concern for envi-
ronmental effects. Such an approach would in most instances avoid
the problem attendant upon the requirement to analyze nearly all "ac-
tions" under the "significantly affecting" test: dilution of government
analysis of each individual project in such a manner as to satisfy only
the letter, but not the spirit, of SEPA. 71
70. See text iccompanying notes 47-48 supra.
71. To avoid such dilution of analysis, governmental agencies may be tempted to
establish sweeping and perhaps unwise categorical exemptions of projects, including
"major" projects, which at first blush do not significantly affect the quality of the
environment, but upon closer analysis may have serious environmental effects. For
example, KING COUNTY CODE § 20.44.180 (1973) exempts from EIS requirements,
"the engagement of consultants to furnish planning, design and related services for
proposed county projects," id. § 20.44.180(e), and, "the county's procurement of
general supplies and services and assessment and collections of taxes .... " id.
§ 20.44.180(i). The activities exempted by the former subsection may well be similar
to the research and development programs found susceptible to EIS analysis under
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If certain financing techniques72 and funding programs 73 were
available to administrative agencies and local governments for imple-
mentation of SEPA, the dilemma discussed above could be largely
avoided: additional manpower and resources would enable govern-
ment administrators to conduct environmental analyses, under the
"significantly affecting" test, of all discretionary nonduplicative ac-
tions, regardless of whether the included project is "major. ' 74 Thus, if
adequate financing is available, the "character of the project" criterion
would no longer be essential to the "major action" test. Although this
approach effectively construes "major action" to mean "any action,"
it is nonetheless the desirable mode of analysis because it permits the
"significantly affecting" inquiry to be reached in a broader spectrum of
cases, thereby most fully implementing SEPA's environmental plan-
ning goals.
II. WHAT MAJOR ACTIONS "SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT
THE QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT"?
An action found to be "major" under the first step of this analysis
will fall within SEPA's EIS requirement only if, under the second step,
it is found to "significantly [affect] the quality of the environment. '75
This examination for environmental "significance" itself involves a
two step analysis:
(1) a definition of "environment", and
(2) construction of the term of art, "significantly affecting".
NEPA in Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d at 1089-90.
"Procurement of general supplies," exempted by the latter subsection, may well have
serious environmental impact if those "general supplies" are natural resource ma-
terials. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1973).
72. For example, CEQA allows California State agencies to delegate the prepar-
ation of EIR's to private parties, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21,100, 21,151 (West
Supp. 1973). Many local California jurisdictions have developed schemes for passing
off costs of environmental analysis onto concerned private parties. See, e.g., San Fran-
cisco Ordinance No. 134-73, §§ 31.45-.47, Apr. 11, 1973.
73. CEQA requires state agencies to submit budget requests specifically for
environmental protection, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,106 (West Supp. 1973), implying
that those requests will be given serious consideration.
74. This would comport with the California scheme under CEQA. See text
accompanying note 43 supra. If this scheme is implemented in Washington, SEPA
should be amended to make all "discretionary actions" (rather than "major actions")
subject to analysis for environmental "significance." Such an amendment would be
necessary since SEPA's existing "major action" language carries with it NEPA's
judicial gloss, including the recognition of "character of the project" as a criterion of
the "major action" determination.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c).
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A. The Meaning of "Environment"
Only by carefully defining the subject "environment" will a
governmental agency know which' impacts to study; and only if the
"environment" is affected, need a court or agency examine
those impacts for significance. Thus, the importance of precisely de-
fining "environment" cannot be overemphasized.76
The drafters of NEPA found that the elusive 77 term "human
environment"78 included: "those life-support systems-natural and
manmade-upon which the health, happiness, -economic welfare, and
physical survival of human beings depend .... -79 While the physical
environment was certainly foremost in the thoughts of NEPA's draf-
ters,80 and is the most commonly conceived "environment", the federal
courts have extended the term "environment" beyond the merely physi-
cal context. The economic environment, for example, was considered
in National Helium v. Morton,8s while the sociological environment
was evaluated in Hanly v. Mitchell (Hanly 1).82
76. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 278 (7th Ed. 1963) describes "envi-
ronment" as:
* . . (a) the complex of climatic, edaphic, and biotic factors that act upon an
organism or an ecological community and ultimately determine its form and
survival .... (b) the aggregate of social and cultural conditions that influence
the life of an individual or community.
77. In the broadest sense of the term, 'Environmental Policy' would encompass
the entire body of Federal law from the Constitution to the least significant
administrative ruling .... Obviously, operational definitions must be devised ....
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 91ST CONG., 2 D SESS.,
A DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 1 (Comm. Print 1970).
78. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
79. Remarks of L.K. Caldwell, a leading proponent of NEPA, quoted in Hanks
& Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 248 (1970).
80. See 115 CONG. REC. 40416-17 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). The
"physical" environment would include the spatial (jeographical) environment, as well
as biological, geological, acoustical and nuclear environments.
81. 326F. Supp. 151 (D. Kans. 1973), aff'd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1973).
82. 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972). In Tierrasanta Community Council v. Richard-
son, 6 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1065, 1068 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (construction of a Federal
Bureau of Prisons youth facility near planned elementary school), the court held:
The ecological effect of the proposed federal youth facility ... is not significant,
but the effect of a youth facility on the human environment in a planned resi-
dential area in close proximity to a proposed elementary school site is so
significant that an agency decision to the contrary is so questionable as to render
it arbitrary and capricious.
Contrast Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 6 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1094
(D. 11. 1973) (HUD-financed public housing project). In Nucleus, the plaintiffs
(homeowners in the vicinity of the proposed project) argued that an influx of
public housing tenants, who allegedly had a "higher propensity toward criminal
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California partially avoids the definitional problems encountered by
the NEPA courts by applying CEQA only to the "physical"
environment. 83 This definition is considerably more limited than that
presently materializing in the NEPA courts. It is improbable, for
instance, that California courts would consider a social criterion such
as "diversity and variety of individual choice" 84 as a part of CEQA's
"environment". 85
In Washington, the Legislature, courts and administrative agencies
have provided only minimal guidance for defining "environment". It
appears nonetheless that "environment" in Washington will be
described much as it has been described in the federal courts. The
Washington State Department of Ecology Guidelines, for example,
provide that "environmental conditions" may be "physical, social [or]
biological." 86 Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court identifies the
behavior . . . a disregard for the maintenance of real and personal property, and a
lower commitment to hard work" than existing residents, would create significant
environmental effects. Id. at 1095. The court rejected this argument, holding that
psychological and social impact was not part of the determination of significant
effects. The court reasoned:
Prognosticating human behavior and analyzing its consequences on the environ-
ment is an especially difficult, if not impossible task . . . . The law regards the
prospective tenants as free, legally responsible individuals, not as sociological
factors in deterministic formulae.
Id. at 1096.
83. CEQA defines "environment" as follows:
'Environment' means the physical conditions which exist within the area which
will be affected by a proposed project, including land, air, water, minerals,
flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic significance.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,060.5. A careful comparison of the purpose and policy
sections of NEPA. SEPA and CEQA also exposes the distinctly "physical" orientation
of CEQA. Compare NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, and SEPA, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.010; NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), and SEPA, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.020(l), with CEQA, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,001.
84. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4331(b) (4); SEPA, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) (e).
85. San Francisco Ordinance No. 134-73, Apr. 11, 1973, interprets CEQA's
definition of "environment" as follows:
The 'environment' is defined by CEQA and the State Guidelines as the physical
conditions existing in the area which will be affected by a proposed project.
Therefore, projects that will have no physical effects are excluded from the
State law.
Id. § 31.12(a).
86. Washington State Department of Ecology, Guidelines for the Implementation
of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, at 7, December, 1972. (The Depart-
ment of Ecology currently has no authority under SEPA to issue rules or regulations.
The Guidelines promulgated by that agency are informal and noncompulsory. They
have not, as of this writing, been cited as authority by ariy Washington appellate court.)
One local jurisdiction in Washington suggests that
[environment] is not intended to mean those things which are physical in nature
only. Environment expressly includes economic, social, political, cultural and other
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purpose of SEPA as being to "prevent and eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere, as well as to promote the welfare of
humans and the understanding of our ecological systems." t8 7 This
language seems to envision "sociological" and "economic," as well as
"physical," environments.
It is appropriate that SEPA's "environment" extend beyond
physical aspects to include economic and social aspects, 88 especially in
view of the inherent difficulty in creating a meaningful distinction
between "physical" and "nonphysical" environments. However, a
major action which affects only the social or economic environment
would not significantly affect the "environment" described by SEPA. 89
The language of the Act suggests that there must be some
identifiable association9 0 with the physical environment to bring an
action within its requirements.91 Once this association initially is
established, proper environmental analysis of the major action then
should encompass the full range of the action's social, economic and
physical impacts.
It is as important as it is obvious to recognize that the
"environment" contemplated by NEPA and SEPA is a dynamic, not a
static, entity. This dynamic environment is characterized by verbs
as well as by nouns-by activities, uses, impacts and changes, as well
as by conditions, dimensions, arrangements, and appearances. Recogni-
tion of this obvious point can aid measurably in arriving at a meaningful
conditions and relationships that exist within or have potential effect upon a
given area under analysis.
City of Kirkland Resolution No. 2181, § 111.3, May 21, 1973.
87. Stempel, 82 Wn.2d at 117,508 P.2d at 171.
88. The Act itself recognizes that, "social, economic, and other requirements" are
worthy of environmental consideration. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(1) Compare
CEQ Guidelines § 1500.8 (a)(3)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,553.
89. Thus a governmental decision on the release of a motion picture affects "the
public environment," Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2641 (1973),
as does the giving of a public speech, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 16 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); but neither action should be subject to SEPA's EIS require-
ment. Similarly, changes in police station procedures affect the "interrogation
environment," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966), but should not be
subject to SEPA.
90. A major action should be deemed to have an "identifiable association" with
the physical environment if it has any discernible, potential effect upon the physical
environment.
91. SEPA recognizes man's dependence upon "biological and physical surroundings,"
and his continuing impact upon the "natural environment," as being the underlying
conditions which call for implementation of state environmental policy. Therefore,
SEPA's implementing mechanisms should focus upon these "physical" and "natural"
conditions. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(I).
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definition of "environment," and hence can aid in analyzing the "signifi-
cance" of environmental effects.
B. The Search for "Significant Effects"
Analysis to this point has been merely preliminary to an actual
examination of the significance of the proposed action's environmental
effects, and has served only to narrow the range of actions to be
given careful environmental study. The actual analysis of effects for
their "significance" should be detailed and sophisticated. Such analysis
necessarily involves considerable governmental time and effort. What-
ever decision is reached by an administrative agency or local govern-
ment as to the "significance" of environmental impacts is subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. 92 A finding by either agency or court that a
major action "significantly" affects the environment invokes all of
SEPA's affirmative "action-forcing" provisions, including the EIS
requirement. 93 Thus, the search for significant environmental effects is
truly the heart and soul of analysis under SEPA because, after all, it
was concern over the degradation of the environment by such "sig-
nificant effects" that prompted environmental legislation.
Once a court or agency defines the subject "environment," it must
then identify whether the defined environment is being or will be
"affected" by a major action. Only when it is determined that in fact
the environment is or will be "affected," need the decision-maker
search for the significance of these effects. Since NEPA and SEPA
require detailed environmental analysis only of "significant" effects,
any phenomenon which is arguably an "effect" or "impact" upon the
environment should be considered for its significance. 94 The purposes
of NEPA and SEPA should not be frustrated by hypertechnical
classifications of phenomena as not being environmental "effects."
Under NEPA, the federal courts generally have found a major
action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 95
to be one which degrades the environment (e.g., highway
92. See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1973).
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2) (c).
94. Although SEPA pertains to actions "significantly affecting" the environment,
the "detailed statement" requirement pertains to environmental "impacts." Whether
there is any meaningful distinction between "environmental effects," and "impacts
upon the environment" (other than the rather tenuous cause-effect distinction) is
doubtful.
95. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
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construction96), curtails the range of beneficial uses (e.g., lease97 or
sale98 of government property), creates both detrimental and
beneficial uses (e.g., erosion control project99), or serves short-term to
the disadvantage of long-term environmental goals.10°
California has led the "little NEPA" states in providing some
scintilla of meaning to the phrase "significantly affecting the quality of
the environment." CEQA requires a finding of significant effect if any
of the following conditions exist:101
(a) A proposed project has the potential to degrade the quality of the
environment, curtail the range of the environment, or to achieve
short-term, to the disadvantage of long-term, environmental goals;
(b) The possible effects of a project are individually limited but
cumulatively considerable;
(c) The environmental effects of a project will cause substantial
adverse effects on human beings, either directly or indirectly.
This language indicates that CEQA requires consideration of many of
the same factors as does NEPA, as construed by the federal courts. 10 2
In Washington, SEPA's "significantly affecting" phrase has received
sparse treatment by the Legislature, administration and courts
alike.103 The presence of "significant" effects was undisputed in all
three Washington Supreme Court cases thus far addressing that
threshold question, although the court did not identify, in any of the
cases, which factors or analysis led to this conclusion. 04
96. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323,
1332 (4th Cir. 1972) ("Without a doubt the Department of Transportation was
intended to be included within NEPA's sweeping language.").
97. See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (lease of Indian
Reservation lands); Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (lease of government land for oil and gas mining).
98. See, e.g., National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP.
1863 (9th Cir. 1973) (sale of Federal forest lands to railroad).
99. See, e.g., Burleigh v. Calloway, 362 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1973) Waikiki
Beach erosion control project).
100. CEQ Guidelines § 1500.6(b), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,551.
101. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21,083. Guidelines interpreting this section of CEQA
are provided in 14CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15,040, 15,081, 15,082 (1973).
102. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has shown that it will interpret
CEQA's "significantly affecting" phrase with a vigor equaling that of the federal
courts, -by warning in Mammoth that "courts will not countenance abuse of the
significant effect qualification of CEQA as a subterfuge to excuse the making of impact
reports.... 8 Cal. 3d at 271, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 777, 502 P.2d at 1065.
103. The best legislative treatment of this phrase in Washington is found in
KING COUNTY CODE § 20.44.050 (1973).
104. Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 488, 513 P.2d at 45; Loveless, 82 Wn. 2d at 764,
513 P.2d at 1029; Stempel, 82 Wn. 2d at 119, 508 P.2d at 172.
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Although a determination that given environmental effects are
"significant" is a particularly subjective one,1 05  perhaps too
subjective, certain factors have been used as guideposts by the
judiciary in construing the term "significantly affecting." Focus upon
these factors in the form of a hypothetical will serve to illustrate how
their consistent application can provide for a more objective analysis
of "significance."
Suppose, for instance, a developer applies for a building permit for a
four-story, sixteen-unit condominium in a medium-size city. The pri-
mary factor for consideration is as important as it is obvious; namely,
new environmental effects are judged relative to the existing impacts
and effects of the defined dynamic environment. If these existing
impacts and effects have been properly identified, and if the decision-
maker brings them to bear upon the "significantly affecting" analysis,
the new and distinct effects can then be evaluated in their proper
perspective. 106 ConcQmitantly, the new, distinct effects of a major
action under study should be analyzed in terms of the likelihood of
their cumulation with existing impacts and effects.107 In our hypo-
thetical, then, the condomiinium's traffic effects should be measured
both against, and in cumulation with, existing traffic patterns to deter-
mine "significance," and visual effects should be likewise measured
relative to the existing neighborhood structural environment.108
With this primary factor in mind-that is, the relative "significance"
of new and distinct effects as measured within a dynamic
framework-the decision-maker can properly commence a reasonably
objective examination of the significance of these effects. Such an
examination should involve separate consideration of: (1) the quality
(nature) of effects; (2) the quantity (magnitude) of effects; and (3)
possible conflicts with relevant environmental control standards.
The Juanita Bay trial court found the fifty-five acre grading permit not to have a
significant effect upon the quality of the environment, but this finding was reversed by
the court of appeals and remanded for agency determination. 9 Wn. App. at 67, 73,
510 P. 2d at 1146, 1149.
105. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1844,
1846(10thCir. 1973).
106. See Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II), 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972).
107. CEQ Guidelines § 1500.6(a), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,55 1.
108. If the construction site is located amidst preexisting multi-story apartments,
the foreseeable visual effect might well be deemed "insignificant".
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1. Qualitative differences between new and existing effects
If the decision-maker finds that the new effects of the subject major
action are qualitatively different from existing impacts and effects in
the defined environment, those effects are "significant," and an EIS is
prima facie required unless they are deemed de minimus. 109 New
qualitative effects are exhibited by new insults upon the environment,
whereas, new quantitative effects are merely an extension of existing
insults. These new insults will be "significant" to most human be-
ings and organizations since they require the development of new
compensatory or corrective mechanisms; whereas, extension of exist-
ing insults requires only that people and organizations strengthen or
adapt already existing mechanisms. In our hypothetical, if the pro-
posed condominium site were in a single family residence area with a
one-story skyline, the visual effects of the completed structure would
be qualitatively different from existing effects; 110 conversely, the effect
of the project upon traffic patterns would be only quantitative, since in
all likelihood existing traffic volume merely would be increased.
2. Quantitative differences between new and existing effects
If no qualitative differences are found-and, indeed, most major
actions simply compound existing environmental effects-the court or
agency should then analyze the significance of any quantitative dif-
ferences identified. In ascertaining the magnitude of the quantitative
differences between new and existing effects, a number of contributing
factors must be considered. Courts, in attempting to objectify the
search for environmental "significance," have often referred directly to
one or more of these contributing factors as conclusive determinants
of "significance." Under the analysis here, however, reference to the
contributing factors aids first in determining quantitatively the magni-
tude of the effects; the determined magnitude of these new effects is
109. The use of the de minimus exception, admittedly a quantitative modifier to
an ostensibly qualitative test, seems to be a practical necessity. For example, a single
one-day military maneuver in a public park may create qualitatively different environ-
mental effects, but it would be so de minimus as to not require the preparation of an
EIS.
110. More obviously, construction of a nuclear reactor in virgin timber land
would lead to environmental effects (radiation, increased stream water temperature)
which are clearly qualitatively different from any preexisting conditions.
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then compared with the magnitude of existing effects in the defined en-
vironment to arrive at a reasonably objective finding of "significance."
First, an identifiable consequence of a given major action under
NEPA and SEPA may be either indirect or secondary, as well as di-
rect or primary, to justify a finding of "significantly affecting."' In
our condominium hypothetical, the presence of a greater concentra-
tion of people in the condominium area may indirectly lead to in-
creased demand for goods and services. Direct effects usually will be
of a greater magnitude than indirect effects.
Second, whether a given effect is one which is highly probable,11 2
substantially possible' 13 or merely arguable,114 is of considerable im-
portance in analyzing its "significance." The federal courts disagree as
to which of these standards is appropriate. 115 A court's decision to
label a particular effect "direct" or "indirect" naturally foreshadows
its inclination in determining the degree of probability of that effect
and, hence, its "significance" or lack thereof.1 16 Thus, the probability
that effects upon utility systems-undoubtedly "direct" effects-
would result from condominium construction is high, if not absolute;
whereas, the likelihood that commercial activity, e.g., the opening of a
store, would indirectly result from condominium construction would
be only possible, or perhaps merely arguable.
Third, the longevity of each type of effect is an important factor for
analysis of NEPA's "significantly affecting" provision. As one com-
mentator suggests, there is "a greater need for better discrimination in
setting priorities between 'persistent and irreversible insults to the
environment and insults that are relatively temporary and nonpersis-
111. See CEQ Guidelines § 1500.8(a) (3) (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,553.
112. This seems to be the Second Circuit's position. See Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d
1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.
1973).
113. See Scientists', supra note 48; see also the dissent of Judge Oakes in Morning-
side, supra note 112.
114. See Maryland Planning Comm'n v. Postal Service, 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP.
1719 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also the dissent of Judge Friendly in Hanly v. Kleindienst
(Hanly 11), 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
115. Compare the cases cited in notes 112-14 supra.
116. Thus in First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466,
472-73 (D.D.C. 1973) (review of Comptroller of Currency's preliminary approval of
bank charter), the court noted that mere government approval of the proposal did not
determine that the project would commence as planned. The court held that NEPA
requires assessment only of direct effects of approval, not speculative, indirect effects.
The court then found that the government action did not "significantly affect" the
environment.
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tent.' ,,117 For example, a five-day military landing exercise would not
"significantly" affect the environment;"18 whereas a program for re-
peated landing exercises in a specified area, over a period of months
or years, might well do so.1 9 In the hypothetical, most effects from
construction would be relatively permanent by the very nature of the
project.
Fourth, whether the new effects are deemed "beneficial" or "detri-
mental" will inevitably bear upon their "significance." 120 After all, it
was concern over the degradation of the environment which prompted
environmental legislation.121 However, the N4EPA cases establish the
proposition that beneficial effects as well as detrimental effects can be
environmentally significant.
With the above contributing factors in mind, a court or agency can
properly analyze the quantitative difference between new and existing
effects, and thereby ascertain the "significance'"-or lack thereof-of the
new effects. This analysis might proceed as follows:
If the magnitude of the new effects, when considered in light of the
above contributing factors, is measurably greater than that of average
existing effects in the defined environment, those effects are "signifi-
cant," and an EIS is prima facie required. This conclusion is justified
in that measurably greater effects are "significant" within the ordinary
meaning of that term; moreover, great quantitative changes are not so
far removed from, and indeed, at some indiscernible degree of magni-
tude become regarded as, qualitative changes. Thus, if the hypothetical
117. G. Rathjens, National Environmental Policy: Goals and Priorities, in F.
GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES AND THE LAW 3 (1971).
118. Citizens For Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Me. 1972).
119. The "impact longevity" criterion looks strangely like the "duration of action"
criterion used in determining if an action is major. See text accompanying note 47
supra. The distinction, however, is conceptually clear: the "duration" criterion applies
to the cause (e.g., a major project), while the "longevity" criterion applies to the
effect (e.g., a significant impact). In practice, it may be difficult to separate the creator
from its creation. Nevertheless, it appears that the federal courts will, properly, adhere
to the conceptual distinction as far as possible. See, e.g., Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d
885 (Ist Cir. 1973) (requiring analysis of the cumulative and precedential values of
amendments to HUD urban renewal contracts to determine if those amendments
constitute "major Federal actions"); and see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326
F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1973), affd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1973) (requiring analysis
of long-range environmental effects of concededly major action).
120. Presumably, the more "detrimental" the effect, the more "significant." See
CEQ Guidelines § 1500.2(b), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,550. However, merely because an
effect is deemed "beneficial" does not mean that is necessarily "insignificant." See, e.g.,
Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 197 1).
121. See 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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four-story condominium were to be placed in an area of single-story
structures, it could be surmised that projected traffic congestion, pop-
ulation density, and burdens upon sewage and other utility systems
would be measurably greater than, and in some respects qualitatively
different from, existing conditions, and that therefore an EIS would
be required.1 22
If, on the other hand, the magnitude of the new effects, when con-
sidered in light of the above contributing factors, is measurably less
than that of average existing effects in the defined environment, those
effects are not "significant," and an EIS is prima facie not required.
This conclusion is justified in that effects of measurably less magnitude
are not "significant" within the ordinary meaning of that term; more-
over, to require analyses of voluminous "insignificant" activities diverts
energies from analyses of more serious environmental concerns.
Where the hypothetical four-story condominium would be located in
an area comprised of existing high-rise apartments and/or commercial
establishments, an EIS should be prima facie unnecessary.1 23
The difficult cases will be those in which the magnitude of the new
effects, when considered in light of the contributing factors, is neither
measurably greater nor measurably less than that of average existing
effects in the defined environment. Such a case would be presented if
the hypothetical four-story condominium were to be constructed
amongst several other existing four-story structures. Doubtful cases of
this type should be resolved in favor of preparation of an EIS, to avoid
progressive degradation of the environment without the comprehen-
sive planning which SEPA mandates; "it is unquestionable that nu-
merous, modest, and common governmental actions may be as dam-
aging to the environment as a single, vigorous and critical action. ' 124
3. Analysis of relevant environmental control standards
Upon reaching a conclusion as to "significance" using either the
qualitative or quantitative mode of analysis, the decision-maker
122. An easier case would be the proposal to build a sixty-story building amongst
existing twenty- story buildings.
123. There may be instances, however, where local regulations designed to protect
the environment could require the preparation of an EIS where it would not otherwise
be required. See text accompanying notes 125-35 infra.
124. Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 492, 513 P.2d at 47.
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should postpone the final decision pending an examination of local,
state or national environmental standards pertaining to the activity
being considered. For instance, an otherwise "insignificant" activity
may "significantly affect" the environment because of its noncompli-
ance with standards of environmental control developed in conjunc-
tion with jurisdiction over functions such as clean air and water main-
tenance, 125 land use and zoning,12 6 transportation planning, 127 solid-
waste management, 12 8 or urban renewal. 129
Whether or not a given major action conflicts with "community"
environmental goals and plans may be a weighty factor in determin-
ing the "significance" of the effects. 130 Of course, to rely upon com-
munity standards to determine significance of environmental effects
is to sacrifice a degree of uniformity in application of state environ-
mental policy.' 31 Even more troublesome is the susceptibility of local
jurisdictions to pressure from powerful interest groups. 32 ' Local
zoning practices, for example, have on occasion been racially13 3 and
125. See Federal Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970 &
Supp. I 1972), and Washington Clean Air Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.010 et seq.
(Supp. 1973); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251
el seq. (Supp. II 1972), and Washington Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.48.010 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
126. See Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et
seq. (Supp. II 1972), and Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA),
WASH. REV. CODE 99 90.58.010 et seq. (Supp. 1973). Note that the "master program"
system of the SMA allows local governments to set up individual compliance mech-
anisms consistent with state guidelines. Id., §§ 90.58.090-.140. See also the proposed
National Land Use Policy Act, S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and the proposed
Washington Land Use Policy Act, S.H.B. 791, 43d Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (1973).
127. See, e.g., The Federal Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 1653 (F) (1970), and WASH. REV. CODE chs. 35.68-.79 (1963).
128. See Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251
et seq. (1970), and Washington Solid Waste Management Act, WASH. REV. CODE §9
70.95.0 10 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
129. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq. (Supp. 11 1972), and WASH. REV. CODE
chs. 35.81, .82 (Supp. 1973).
130. See, e.g., 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15,081(c) (1) (1973).
131. See generally Weinberg, Regional Land-Use Control: Prerequisite for
Rational Planning, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 786 (1971). Balkanized zoning power has
evidenced the difficulties in promoting local control without at the same time fostering
various exclusionary practices. See Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Town-
ship, 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129, 140-50 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied
and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
132. Private parties often are permitted to, "invoke the constitutional power of the
municipality or other local unit to achieve what are in fact only private ends."
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 138 (Paperback ed. 1969).
133. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a city
ordinance which denied to blacks the right to occupy homes in city blocks in which
the greater number of homes were occupied by whites.) One of the environmentalists'
biggest problems will be convincing minorities that environmental law is not a "plot
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economically 134restrictive; they have favored heavy industrial construc-
tion, created urban sprawl, and effectively destroyed open space and
shorelines access. 135 Thus the application of community standards
should not in all cases determine the "significance" of new environ-
mental effects. Rather, the community standards related to the pro-
posal being scrutinized should merely contribute to, and perhaps
modify, the preliminary decision of environmental "significance" al-
ready reached.
III. EXEMPTIONS
The discussion under Sections I and II has attempted to give mean-
ing to the phrase, "major action significantly affecting the quality of
the environment." When a Washington court decides that the subject
of litigation is a major action significantly affecting the quality of the
environment within the meaning of SEPA, the Act then requires that a
"detailed statement" (EIS) be prepared. 136 There are, however,
numerous governmental activities which are definitely not "major ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the environment," and thus
need not be analyzed at all. Such activities should be "exempted" from
SEPA's EIS requirement by either the judicial, the legislative or, with
proper authority, the administrative branch.
Federal agencies seldom create "categorical" administrative exemp-
tions from NEPA's EIS requirement, because their actions are gener-
ally regarded as being so "major," and their effects so "significant,"
that an EIS will most often be required. 137 Moreover, NEPA exhibits
by the rich to keep what they have in beauteous array." I V. YANNACONE, ENVIRON-
MENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES 344 (1972). Further, application of the equal protection
doctrine to local restrictive zoning could seriously debilitate environmental control
measures. Sussna, Environmental Control and Land Use, 48 J. URBAN L. 689,
697-98 (1971).
134. A state environmental policy must insure that economically backward areas
are not forced to remain depressed as the price of environmental protection of more
fortunate communities. F. GRAD, Intergovernmental Aspects of Environmental Controls,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES AND THE LAW 182 (1971).
135. E. Haskell, Managing the Environment: Nine States Look for New Answers
33 (1971) (a study funded by a Ford Foundation grant).
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c).
137. One commentator suggests, for instance, that virtually all of the actions of
the Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Power Commission and Department of
Transportation will require an impact statement. Cramton, On Leading a Horse to
Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REV. 511, 519 (1973).
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no legislative intent to confer authority upon federal agencies to create
exempt categories. CEQA, by contrast, requires state and local gov-
ernment agencies to create and maintain classifications of actions
exempt from the requirements of the Act. 138
SEPA, like NEPA (and unlike CEQA), exhibits no express legisla-
tive intent to confer exemption authority upon either state or local
government agencies; 139 consequently, administrative involvement in
Washington has been minimal.1 40 The lack of administrative regula-
tions pursuant to SEPA has created an unfortunate result in local ju-
risdictions. Confused and frustrated by the 1973 judicial interpreta-
tions of SEPA,1 41 several Washington counties and municipalities
forged ahead with their own regulations and exemptions, notwith-
standing the lack of express legislative authority to do S0.142 The re-
sult is a patchwork of localized procedures which the courts may well
disregard. 143
138. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,083.
139. SEPA itself exempts "single family" structures from its mandates, ch. 179, § I
[1973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. The 1974 amendments to SEPA, signed by the Gov-
ernor during final editing of this note, see notes 146-52 infra, provide that the newly-
established "Council on Environmental Policy" shall identify actions "exempt" from
SEPA's EIS requirement. Ch. 179, § 6(l)(a) [ 1974] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
140. The Washington State Department of Ecology has promulgated regulations
interpreting and applying the "single family residence" exemption, supra note 139.
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 173-34-010 et seq. (1973).
141. For example, uncertain of the ramifications of the Eastlake opinion, defendant
City of Seattle maintained a ten-day moratorium on the issuance of building permits
until city policy could be established in compliance with the opinion. Seattle Times,
Aug. 18, 1973, at A4, col. 3; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 28, 1973, at A3, col. 2.
142. See KING COUNTY CODE §§ 20.44.090-.180 (1973) (the latter establishing
"categorical" exemptions from SEPA); Yakima County, Resolution in the Matter of
Complying with the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, § 1, May 22, 1973;
City of Kirkland Resolution No. 2181, April 19, 1973, and Kirkland Interim Regula-
tions and Guidelines Pursuant to Resolution No. 2181, pp. 1-3, May 21, 1973; City
of Seattle Standard Operating Procedure No. 100-004, "Protection of the Environ-
ment," §7, Oct. 1, 1973; City of Tacoma Planning Department, Interim Planning
Department Guidelines for Compliance with the State Environmental Policy Act of
1971, Procedure l.c, Sept. 25, 1973.
143. [In Washington] 'a state law will not be construed as impliedly taking
away from a first class city an existing power.' [Rather, it must appear,] in clear
and unambiguous language, that the legislature intended to make the act mandatory
and not permissive ....
Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 862, 866, 395 P.2d 82, 84 (1964) (emphasis
added). Since SEPA is clearly and unambiguously a "mandate to every state and local
agency and department," Stempel, 82 Wn. 2d at 118, 508 P.2d at 171, Washington
courts need not defer to local legislation interpreting the requirements of the Act.
See generally Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington,
38 WASH. L. REv. 743, 769-81 (1963).
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Under little NEPAs, vis-a-vis NEPA itself, "categorical" exemptions
are appropriate and, sometimes, essential. The broad police power
asserted by the states and their subdivisions has supported a great va-
riety of environmental control measures, of all degrees of impor-
tance.14 4 Hence, unlike the Federal government, where most actions
are "major," and most effects "significant," states engage in many
"minor" and "insignificant" activities. Thus, the states must engage in
considerable selectivity so as to apply their little NEPAs to their most
serious environmental problems, without dissipating limited resources
on minor environmental impacts. It is therefore inappropriate and
impractical for a state such as Washington to follow the federal lead
by precluding administrative determinations of exempt categories.
IV. THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
In 1973, four Washington appellate court opinions addressed them-
selves to the single question of when an EIS is required by SEPA. The
contribution of those decisions can, at this juncture, be but imper-
fectly assessed; yet it is clear from SEPA's batting average in the
courts (the Act was found applicable and binding upon the parties in
all four cases) that the Washington judiciary champions the environ-
mental cause.
What is not clear, however, is whether the game that the environ-
mentalists have been so consistently winning has any rules. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court, in a trilogy of opinions (Stempel, Eastlake
and Loveless), has done little more than describe the bare bones of a
definition of "major action" under SEPA. Not one of the four opin-
ions rendered in 1973 made more than a cursory analysis of SEPA's
crucial phrase, "significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment."' 145 The Washington Legislature and administration have been
even less helpful. In short, the work has yet to begin to make SEPA a
viable and predictable piece of legislation. 14 6 Predictability and fore-
144. Compare, e.g., City of Seattle's Billboard and Off-Premise Sign Ordinance,
No. 102564, November 6, 1973; with Washington's Thermal Power Plant Siting Act,
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 80.50.0 10 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2]C.030(2) (c).
146. During the final editing of this note, the Governor signed (with certain vetoed
exceptions) S.B. 3277, which substantially amends many of SEPA's provisions, ch.
179, [1974] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. As explained in the following notes, many of
the recommendations suggested by this note have now been enacted in ch. 179.
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warning of SEPA's applicability to projects is most desirable, so that
all parties are aware of the groundrules before the die, or perhaps
more appropriately, the concrete, is cast. The Washington Legislature
could measurably increase SEPA's viability and predictability by:
(1) authorizing promulgation of broad, uniform SEPA master reg-
ulations of statewide application; 147
(2) authorizing adoption of rules and regulations by individual state
agencies and local governments to implement SEPA's master regula-
tions, all in substantial conformance with the SEPA master regula-
tions;148
(3) authorizing identification, by any state agency or local govern-
ment, of activities "exempt" from SEPA, so long as such determina-
tions do not violate the public policy of SEPA nor deviate from the
SEPA master regulations; 49
(4) specifying a uniform standard of judicial review applicable to
all administrative and local government threshold determinations
made pursuant to SEPA, the SEPA master regulations and applic-
able rules and regulations, 50 and a standard procedure for reviewing
rules and regulations adopted pursuant to SEPA; 151
(5) enacting a meaningful statute of limitations with respect to chal-
lenges of governmental actions which have been found to be a "major
action significantly affecting the environment" and those which have
not been so found. 152
147. This has been accomplished by ch. 179, § 6 [1974] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
Compare 14 CAL. ADMNfl. CODE §§ 15,000 et seq. (1973).
148. See ch. 179, § 8 [1974] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. Compare San Francisco,
Cal., Ordinance No., 134-73, April 11, 1973, conforming substantially with CEQA's
Guidelines.
149. See note 139 supra. Compare San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 134-73, §§
31.12-.17, April 11, 1973. - '
150. See, e.g., the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), WASH. REv.
CODE ch. 34.04 (1963); § 34.04.130 (Supp. 1973). Although WAPA does not apply
to decisions of local jurisdictions' v-an amendment to SEPA could so apply it. This
would establish uniform judicial'.!eview of all decisions made pursuant to SEPA,
regardless of the decision-makifigb6dy None of the 1973 or 1974 amendments to
SEPA accomplish this purpose.
151. This has been accomplished by the 1974 amendments, which provide that the
rules adopted by the Council on Environmental Policy (CEP) and those adopted by
state agencies, "shall be subject to the review procedures of R.C.W. § 34.04.070 and §
34.04.080." Ch. 179, §§ 6(3), 8(2) [1974] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. Rules adopted
by public and municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and counties are to be
reviewed by the CEP for conformance with the CEP rules and guidelines, and its de-
cisions are final. Id., § 9(3).
152. See ch. 179, §§ 2, 3 [1974] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. See also Roe & Lean,
supra note 2, at 543-45; and CEQA, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,167.
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SEPA's master regulations should be primarily definitional and ex-
plicative. These regulations might adopt the framework for analysis
suggested in this note. Thus:
(1) Analysis under the "major action" test should include scrutiny of:
(a) the nature of the governmental decision;
(b) the character of the subject project; and
(c) the "nexus" between decision and project.
(2) Analysis under the "significantly affecting" test should include:
(a) description of the surrounding environment; and
(b) identification of ascertainable environmental effects, and
analysis of their "significance," by: (i) identification of any
"qualitatively different" new effects; (ii) measurement of
the magnitude of new effects after consideration of factors
such as directness, probability, longevity and detriment, and
comparison of the new effects with existing effects in the de-
fined environment; (iii) examination of local standards rele-
vant to determinations of environmental "significance." 15 3
The SEPA master regulations should provide a framework within
which governmental agencies could identify exempt categories.15 4 The
starting point, of course, would be an examination of the criteria per-
taining to the "major action" and "significantly affecting" threshold
determinations. If a given type of activity does not satisfy those cri-
teria, it may be eligible for "exempt" classification.
These broad master regulations, however, should leave sufficient
play in the joints to allow for local interpretation of SEPA's EIS re-
quirement. Local interpretation could be responsive to environ-
mental problems peculiar to a certain community, and could be inte-
grated with existing local environmental control techniques such as
zoning. 155
The above suggestions are not panacean; rather, they serve to de-
scribe certain "practicable means"156 by which to implement the
153. It would perhaps be wise to develop and maintain statewide minimum legal
standards of environmental "significance" with which all jurisdictions within the state
should substantially comply. See, e.g., 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15,081-82 (1973).
154. See, e.g., id. §§ 15,100-16.
155. See notes 125-31 and accompanying text supra. Local agencies in Washington
have already forged ahead by interpreting SEPA's "significantly affecting" phrase for
their individual spheres of operation. See, e.g., KING COUNTY CODE § 20.44.050
(1973); City of Seattle Standard Operating Procedure No. 100-004, "Protection of
the Environment," §§ 7.2(b)&(c), October 1, 1973.
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public policy of SEPA. This note proposes a mode of analysis, not
black-letter rules, by which to effectuate SEPA's policy. If SEPA, with
its newly-acquired judicial gloss, is recognized as the "continuing pol-
icy of the state of Washington,' 157 it then remains for the decision-
makers of the state to live up to their "continuing responsibility... to
use all practical means"'158 to make SEPA work for the citizens.
John D. Alkire
156. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.020(2).
157. Id. § 43.2 1C.020(1).
158. Id.
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APPENDIX A
ANALYTICAL FLOWCHART
Analytical process for determination of whether
an environmental impact statement should be prepared
is the activity exempted by law or
authorized regulation? yes
no
is the governmental decision
"discretionary" and "nonduplicative?" no-
I
is there a "major project" involved? no-
"MAJOR
ACTION" yes
ANALYSIS is there sufficient "nexus" between
decision and project? no-
ves
A "MAJOR ACTION" IS PRESENT
identification of the surrounding
"dynamic environment"
is the major action "affecting" the
identified environment? no
yes
yes can new "qualitatively different" effects! be identified?
"SIGNIFI- noCANTLY_
FFECTING consideration of factors for quantitative
ANALYSIS analysis
what is the measure of the "quantitative
difference" between new and existing effects?
new effects
new effects new effects
measurably greater approximately measurably lessthan existing t exsameng than existing
existing
closer scrutiny of quantitative
factors
consideration of relevant environmental
control standards
- are "SIGNIFICANT" EFFECTS no EIS NOT
EIS REQUIRED ---ye present? n REQUIRED
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